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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
<>F rrHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOH<>THY :M. BIRD, 
J>ctitioncr and Appellant, 
vs. 
OLIVE S< >RENSON, Case No. 
City Recorder, 
Respondent, 
HAROLD L. WELCH and 
Dr~E GLEN SMITH, 
lutervenors and Respondents, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STArrE~IENT OF KIND OF CASE 
10050 
This is an action by petitioner-appellant to obtain 
a writ of n1andan1us con1pelling respondent to submit 
by referendun1 to the voters of the City of Washington 
Terrace, Utah, an ordinance re-classifying property 
frmn a residential to a co1nn1ercial zone. 
DISPOSITIO~ IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment 
dismissing appellant's Petition for a Writ of Mandamus 
against respondent, appellant has appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, Olive Sorenson, seeks affirmation of 
the Order of the trial court dismissing appellant's 
Petition for a \Y rit of ~Iandamus. 
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STATE1\.IENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is a resident of the City of Washington 
Terrace. (R 4. and 10) Respondent, Olive Sorenson, 
is the City Recorder of the City of Washington Terrace. 
(R 4. and 10.) Harold L. Welch and Dee Glen Smith, 
Intervenors and Respondents, are the holders of certain 
options to purchase the premises concerned which were 
re-classified fron1 a residential to a commercial use by 
Washington Terrace City Ordinance dated November 
14, 1963, Exhibit "A" of appellant's Petition for Writ 
of Mandamus. (R. 10 (6),(7),4. (4) ) 
On the 7th day of January, 1960, the City of 
Washington Terrace adopted a Comprehensive Zoning 
Ordinance for the city. (R. 10 (1) ) 
On August 28, 1961, the planning commission of 
the city cornmenced discussions and studies for the 
preparation of a Master Plan of the city in acco.rdance 
with the authority granted by the provisions of Section 
10-9-20, U.C.A. 1953. The work in preparation of the 
Master Plan continued from August 28, 1961, to Decem-
ber 10, 1962, at which tin1e the planning commission 
unanimously recommended a Master Plan to the 
Washington Terrace City Council for adoption. The 
city council, in accordance with the authority granted 
by Section 10-9-21, U.C.A., 1953, unanimously adopted 
the proposed Master Plan in the exact form recommended 
by the planning commission. On September 2±, 1963, a 
request was filed with the Washington Terrace City 
Council by the intervenor-respondents for the rezoning 
from Residential R-2 to Commercial C-2 of the premises 
described in Exhibit "A" to appellant's Petition for 
Writ of 1\fandamus, which premises had been designated 
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for commercial use in the Master Plan previously adop-
ted by the city on January 2, 1963. That pursuant to 
law the city council referred the request to the planning 
commission for study and recommendation. After the 
planning commission had studied the request and con-
sulted with an expert planner from the staff of the 
Weber County Planning Commission, it recommended 
to the city council that the request to rezone said premises 
be approved. (R 10. (1) (2) ) 
Pursuant to law the Washington Terrace City 
Council ordered a public hearing to be held, and proper 
notice of said. public hearing was given stating the 
nature of the proposed change in zoning. The public 
hearing was held on the 13th day of November, 1963, 
and all persons interested in the matter were granted 
an opportunity to be heard. Subsequent to the public 
hearing the city council enacted the ordinance by a vote 
of four in favor of and one against the re-classifying 
of the described property from Residential R-2 zone 
to Commercial C-2 zone under the provisions of the 
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of the City of Wash-
ington Terrace. (R 10. (2) ) The change of classifi-
cation of the premises was in furtherance of and con-
sistent with the Master Plan of the City of Washington 
Terrace as adopted by the city council. (R 10. (2) (3) ) 
The Ordinance re-classifying the property concerned 
to a different use was the only change made in the 
previously adopted Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance. 
(R 10. (3) ) 
Subsequent to the passage of the ordinance re-
cassifying the described premises to commercial use 
appellant sought to have said ordinance submitted to 
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a referendum vote and took the action stated on pageE 
2. and 3. of appellant's brief. 
Appellant has made no complaint as to the 
sufficiency of the legal procedure followed by the City 
of Washington Terrace in respect to its adoption of 
its Con1prehensive Zoning Ordinance and f.Iaster Plan, 
or to the procedure followed in the re-classification 
of the premises concerned to a zone which conformed 
to the Master Plan of the city. 
ARGUMENT 
'POINT I 
THE ZONING LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARE SPECIAL STATUTES DEALING WITH A 
PARTICULAR SUBJECT AND MUST BE DEEMED 
TO BE CONTROLLING OVER THE REFERENDUM 
STATUTES WHICH ARE GENERAL IN SCOPE. 
The Utah Statutes dealing with zoning grant to 
municipalities the authority to adopt zoning ordinances 
for the purpose of providing for the appropriate use of 
land in accordance with a comprehensive plan. These 
statutes are special statutes dealing with objectives and 
procedures within a particular subject and are to be 
distinguished from statutes which are general in scope. 
One of the important distinctions between the general 
statutes and these special statutes dealing with par-
ticular subjects is the manner in which the special 
statutes provide for the administration of the special 
subject matter. 
The controlling proposition of law with refer-
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ence to this phase of the case is that if a general law 
providing for a referendu1n is in conflict with a special 
statute relating to the same subject matter and making 
no provision for a referendum, the special statutes will 
not be subject to referendum. 
The governing body of a city is not free to enact 
or amend a zoning ordinance without first complying 
with all of the safeguards provided in the public in~· 
terest by the special zoning statutes. These safeguards 
require the city council to first refer a new compre-
hensive zoning plan, or a change in an existing zoning 
map to the planning commission of the city for their 
study and recommendation. The planning commission 
studies the matter, consults with such professional 
planners as it deems necessary, hears the views of 
interested persons, and when such study is completed 
makes its recommendations to the city council. However, 
before the city council can adopt their recommenda-
tions they must first hold a public hearing regarding 
the proposed zoning change. At this hearing, conduct-
ed by the city council, all interested citizens have 
an opportunity to express their views on the matter. 
It is only after .the planning commission's recommen-
dations have been made, and the public hearing has 
been held that the city council may enact a zoning 
ordinance or change the classification of property un-
der an existing comprehensive zoning ordinance. It 
can be seen that when a city acts under a special statute 
such as that dealing with zoning, a completely differ-
ent procedure is required to give both the planning 
commission and the city council an opportunity to 
thoroughly study and evaluate the zoning problem. 
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[he enactment of general laws and ordinances arE 
~wt subject to the requirement of study by an ind<: 
pendent body and the obligation to hold a public hear-
in. (U. C. A. 1953, 10-9-1 through 5, inclusive) 
The clear legislative intent in drafting the zoning 
statutes was to provide a comprehensive carefully 
studied system of designating property use zones and 
reclassifying property use zones within the city. 
It was the clear intent of the legislature to place zoning 
in the hands of two separate bodies of citizens with 
the background, knowledge, and judgment to make wise 
decisions on behalf of the entire community. The idea 
of a review of the decisions of the city council in re-
classifying property under a comprehensive zoning 
plan by the referendum route was quite plainly the 
farthest thing from the legislative thought. To set 
aside the judgment of the planning commission and 
the city council, acting under their designated statu-
tory authority, would be to interupt and destroy the 
scheme and purpose of the entire zoning statutes. To hold 
that the action of the city council in changing the use 
classification of a single piece of property is subject 
to referendum would negative the basic theory and 
purpose of having specialized zoning statutes in our 
state. 
In the case of L. E. Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty 
Co.) 3 U2 1, 277 P2 805, the Utah Court said at page 807: 
"However, a survey of cases involving initia-
tive and referendun1 petitions indicates that the 
line drawn between administrative and legisla-
tive functions is not the only limitation recognized 
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by th~, courts a~ to the applicability of legisla-
tion to panicular ordinances." (Emphasis ours) 
In the lJewey P Doxey-Layton <'£UiP, the court recog-
nize~ that specia] ordinance~ which are passed only 
after noti('(' and public hearings are generally held 
to be outside the operation of the initiative and refer-
enduin laws. The court at page 807 further stated: 
"Where the power to regulate utility rates is 
given to the n1unicipality by general law or 
charter provision setting out the procedure to 
be followed and providing for notice and hearings 
to the persons affected by such regulation, ordin-
ances dealing with the fixing of rates are general-
ly held to be outside the operation of initiative 
and referendu1n laws. In Southwestern Tel. & 
Tel. Co. v. City of Dallas, 104 Tex. 114, 134 S. W. 
321,322, the court held that the phrase 'any 
proposed ordinance,' contained in the provision 
setting out the procedure for the application of 
the initiative power, did not include all ordinances 
upon any subject of legislation and that an initi-
ated ordinancP fixing maximurn telephone rates 
was invalid since the charter gave the legisla-
tive body of the city the power to regulate 
utility rates only after notice and hearings to 
the person affected." 
The question before the court is not whether a 
comprehensive zoning ordinance of a municipality may 
be submitted to the voters on a properly conducted 
referendum. The question is if a city has adopted 
a comprehensive zoning ordinance after receiving 
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recommendations from the planning c01nmission and 
conducting the public hearings required by law, the 
validity of which cmnprehensive ordinance is not in 
question, then is each re-classification of property from 
one use to another within the purposes and objectives 
of such ordinance and in compliance with the Master 
Plan adopted by the city, subject to be referred to the 
electorate on a referendum? 
Respondent submits that to require a municipality 
to refer each change in classification of property to 
effectuate the comprehensive zoning ordinance and the 
Master Plan of the city to a referendu1n would not 
only destroy and put to naught the comprehensive 
zoning ordinance and the Master Plan, but would 
create such a confusion of plan and such a departure 
from the orderly municipal planning intended by the 
legislature as to destroy the whole structure of zoning. 
In the Dewey v Doxey-Layton case, supra, the 
court further discussed the subject in the following 
language at page 809 : 
"In the present case, the legislature has delegated 
the power to zone to the legislative body of 
cities and towns, so that the need for a compre-
hensive plan might be met, and provided means 
for the protection of private property through 
notice and public hearings. U. C. A., 1953, 10-9-1 
ff. Thus when appellants seek to initiate re-
zoning within the city without complying with 
the zoning statute, they are, in effect, attacking 
collaterally the very statute under which they 
claim their power to zone." 
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~imilarly, whPn op;>mtPnts to rezoning seek to 
defeat rezoning by u~P of the referendum, tlwy are 
attaeking <'olluternlly the statute which gives the rity 
council the powPr to zone the eity under a con1prehensive 
plan unifor1n in eharndPr, and by which the city 
council lm~ tlw power to nmke change~, alteration~, and 
nwdit'icntions in the plan as HUt~' be necessary and 
adviseable. 
The State Legi~lature in creating special statutes 
to deal with the forn1ulating of plans on highly special-
ized subjects such as zoning recognized that changes 
in zoning must be thoughtfully analyzed and adininis-
tered in the best interest of the entire conrmunity. 
The placing of Sitch specialized 1natters on the ballot 
deprives the comrnunity of the benefit of the study of 
the 1natter by the planning con1mis8ion and of the 
exercise of the judgn1ent of the city council. 
POINT 11 
'rHE rrRTAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT 
" ... HERE A CITY HAS ADOPTED A COlVIPREHEN-
SIVE PLAN OF ZONING A_ SUBSEQUENT ORDIN-
ANCE 1IERELY CHANGING THE USE CLASS-
IFICATION OF A PARTICULAR PIECE OF PROP-
ERTY IS NOT SUBJECT TO REFERENDUM:. 
It is conceded, at page 5 of appellant's brief, 
that courts have long recognized that direct legislation 
statutes such as initiative and referendum are applic-
cable only to the legislative acts of a municipal 
corporation and are not applicable to the administra-
tive acts of the governing body of the city. This rule 
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has been recognized and followed by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
In Keigley v Bench, 97 Utah 69, 89 P2 480, the 
court in discussing the types of city ordinances subject 
to referendum, at page 482, stated: 
"We have definitely intimated that under R. S. 
Utah, 1933, 25-10-21, only ordinances which are 
legislative in character must be referred. 
Keigley et al. v Bench,90 Utah 569, 63 Pac. 
2d 262, we held that the resolution questioned 
was legislative in character and was, therefore, 
subject to referendum (citations) :WhiCJh .con-
fine the referendum to legislative acts." 
Continuing at page 483 of the opinion the court stated: 
"The wording, we think, clearly expresses the 
intention to limit the referendum to the acts of 
the governing body performed in the execution 
of its function as a 'law-making' body. This con-
struction is clearly indicated by reference to 
section 1 of Article 6 of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah.***We, therefore, construe 
the language of said statute (referendum 
statute) to apply only to laws, ordinances, reso-
lutions or motions which are the legislative in 
character, * * To hold otherwise would so serious-
ly interfere with municipal government and ad-
mnistration that we could not espouse the view 
without explicit statutory pronouncement, despite 
the holdings or intimations of some jurisdict-
ions extending the referendum into actions of an 
administrative character." (Emphasis ours) 
10 
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The decision in Dlfyer v City Co1rncil of Berkeley, 
253 P. 932, as appellant concedes, is based upon the word-
ing of the referendum provisions of the Berkeley City 
Charter rather than on the statutes of the State of 
California. ~1any cases recognize the fact that the grant 
of a charter to a municipality gives a municipality a 
far greater degree of latitude than is possessed by 
municipalitiet-i operating under the general state stat-
utes without the adoption of a charter. The rule has 
been established that the acts of a charter city need not 
be consistent with all of the statutory provisions of the 
state but must only be consistent with the charter. 
It is submitted that the Dwyer v Berkely case is not 
controlling in the fact and law situation now before the 
court because of the important distinction set forth 
above. 
In regard to the distinction between administrative 
and legislative functions of a city as applied to referen-
dum on salaries of city employees, the Utah courts have 
expressly rejected the California precedents. 
In Shriver v Bench, 6 Utah 329, 313 P2 475, the 
court did not follow the decisions of California which 
held that the fixing of salaries of city employees was 
a legislative rather than an administrative act. The 
court, at page 478, said: 
"• • analyzing the factors which should be taken 
into consideration in fixing salaries, together with 
other considerations which must be weighed in 
individual cases, presents a problem of such 
complexity that it is not practical for the public 
to give it sufficient time and attention to make a 
11 
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proper determination of the 1natter, and further, 
that the changes which are continually occur-
ring 1nake highly desirable that there be some 
expeditious method of re-examining the situation 
at frequent intervals." 
The sound judgment of the foregoing statement 
regarding salaries applies equally to the handling of the 
complexities of zoning and the necessity for re-examin-
ation of the zoning provisions in the light of the continual 
growth and development of the modern community. 
The court in the Shriver case lays down a rule 
representative of the modern approach to this municipal 
question in the following language at page 478: 
"If the result would be to impair the efficient 
administration of the municipality, the courts 
tend toward the conclusion that initiative and 
referendum provisions are not applicable." 
At the conclusion of the foregoing quotation the 
footnote calls attention to a case note in 5 Utah Law Re-
view 413. The law review case note is concerned with 
the case of Kelley v John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 NW2 713 
(1957). The Nebraska court when faced with a fact 
situation remarkably similar to the one now before this 
court said at page 715: 
"It is the rule in this state that the referendum 
provisions of our statutes apply to legislative 
acts, but not to administrative or executive mat-
ters. If an ordinance serves merely to put into 
execution a previously enacted law, it is clearly 
administrative or executive in character. The 
crucial test for detennining that which is legis-
12 
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latin· frotu that whieh i~ ad1ninistrative or exe-
('UtivP is ._,·hether the aetion taken was one 
mal:ing- a law, or executing or administering a 
law already in existence. (Citations) It see1ns 
cit> a r to us that an ordinance adopting a com-
fJrl'h('nsic(' plau for zo11ing a city is a legislative 
Inattl'r. It is a determination that the 1nayor and 
coun('il of the city, acting legislatively, have con-
eluded that zoning is beneficial to the best interest 
of the city. Since it is legislative in character, 
it may he subn1itted to the qualified electors 
of the city in the forn1 of a referendu1n to de-
tennine if the ordinance shall or shall not be ap-
proved. In the present case no such action was 
takt•n and the Yalidity of the ordinance of N ovem-
ber 27 1932, is not questioned." 
The court continues at page 715: 
"It seems clear to us that the ordinance in 
question purports to carry out the purposes of 
the c01uprehensive zoning ordinances which lat-
ter ordinance was a valid exercise of legislative 
power. In putting this ordinance into effect the 
city council acts ad1ninistratively. In State 
ex rel. Ballantyne v Leeman, Supra (149 Neb. 
8-±7, 32 N.W. 2 921) we said, 'It was set out gener-
ally that when an ordinance enacts a law or 
lays down a rule of conduct or course of policy to 
guide the citizens, there can be no question but 
that it is legislati-..;-e in character and referable 
but on the other hand, if it serves simply to put 
into execution previmtsly enacted laws, it is 
13 
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clearly executive in character. (Citations) (Em-
phasis ours) 
It is fundamental also that to permit a 
referendum to be invoked to annul or delay execu-
tive action would be to destroy the efficiency 
necessary to successful administration of the 
business affairs of a municipality (citation). The 
policy of the municipality was determined by the 
adoption of the comprehensive zoning ordinance. 
The administration of the ordinance, including 
the change in the classification of particular 
pieces of property, very rarely affects all the 
electors of a municipality. To say that adminis-
trative determinations are subject to referendum 
could defeat the very purposes of zoning. The 
uniformity required in the proper administration 
of a zoning ordinance could be wholly destroyed 
by referendum. A single decision by the electors 
by referendum could well destroy the very pur-
pose of zoning where such decision was in con-
flict with the general scheme fixing the uses of 
property in designated areas. This alone is suf-
ficient to sustain the holding that an ordiance 
administrative in character is not subject to ref-
referendum. It would permit the electors by 
referendum to change, delay, and defeat the real 
purposes of the comprehensive zoning ordinance 
by creating the chaotic situation such ordinance 
was designed to prevent. The determination as 
to whether or not a city desires to embark upon a 
policy of zoning for the purpose of regulating and 
restricting the construction and use of buildings 
14 
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within a fixed a n·a is a legislative nmtter ~uhject 
to referendu1n. But when such policy ha~ bePn 
determined, the changing of such areas, or the 
rrrantin/J of exceptions, arc committed to tlle 
mayor and co 11 neil as adminisratiue 1natters in 
order to :-:cc1tre the uniformity nrcessar.IJ to the 
accom}Jlishnwnt of the purposes of the compre-
hcnsirc zoniug ordinance. In the case at bar the 
city council has sought to fit the property here in-
volved into a n1aster plan which it believes 
properly should be classified as business property. 
If its action may be nullified by a referendum 
then the comprehensive 1naster plan becomes a 
nullity, and every change of classification of 
propert~· 1nade by the city council will be subject 
to the whilns of the electors without regard to 
the master plan. No such result wa8 intended 
by the Legislature which lends support to the 
reasoning of our holdings that administrative 
acts carrying out the purposes of a valid ordin-
ance are not referable to the electors. The fol-
lowing cases support the principle, although they 
are disimilar on their facts. (Citations, emphasis 
ours). 
For the reasons herein stated the ordinance 
changing the classification of the property herein 
involved from a residence classification to a busi-
ness classification is ad1ninistrative in character 
and therefore not a matter that could be referred 
to the electors under the referendum provisions 
of our statutes. The procedures prescribed in the 
comprehensive zon1ng ordinance described as 
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Ordinance No. 699, provides the exclusive method 
for determining the correctness of the action of 
the city council and the board of adjustment. 
* * * The judgment of the district court in sus-
taining the action of the city council in directing 
that Ordinance No. 795 be referred to the elec-
tors of the city under the referendum act is 
therefore in error. The judgment of the district 
court is reversed and the cause remanded with 
directions to the trial court to overrule the de-
murrer to plaintiffs' petition." 
An examination of the Nebraska statutes conferr-
ing zoning powers upon municipalities shows that they 
are very similar to the powers granted cities under the 
laws of our state. 
Appellant attempts to distinguish to Kelley v 
John decision, supra, on the ground that in this case 
the party seeking the referendum had an opportunity 
to protest the zoning change before a board of adjust-
ment. However, appellant fails to inform the court 
that in Nebraska the board of adjustment is the city 
council, and in the Kelley v John fact situation would be 
the same city council that passed the change of classifi-
cation of property complained of. 
In the case of Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator 
Co. v Carl Nadasdy, 76 NW2 670, (Minn.) 1956, the same 
sound principle that an amendment to a comprehensive 
zoning ordinance is an administrative matter not sub-
ject to referendum was pronounced by the court. In 
this particular case the village council of Golden Valley 
had adopted a comprehensive zoning code in which 
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tlw trad of land in question had been (·la~~il'ipd as 
"opPn dt>vulopment". An ordinance amending- the zone-
ing <·odP wa~ acloptt>d hy the village couneil at a later 
d:dt> lll 1der whi<'h tht- ~at:tr propt-rty was rezoned to an 
'lndu~trial Zoning Di~trid'. A petition to have the 
amendntent to the zoning code sub1nitted to the voters 
hy rd\•rendtun was filed, and by reason thereof the 
plaintiff's application for a construction pennit for an 
industrial building on the tract of land re-classified was 
denied. The village council was in doubt as to its 
right to grant a building pennit in view of the referen-
dmn petition filed with the village clerk. .:\[andamus 
was then brought by the plaintiff to compel the village 
to issue the requested building pennit. The court held 
as follow~ at page 67 4: 
"The basic issue presented by this appeal is 
whether the referendum-election provisions of 
Section 462.01 applies solely to a comprehensive 
type of zoning ordinance or, as the intervenors 
contend, applies also to an altering or amending 
ordinance such as the one involved in the in-
stant case." 
The court continued at page 675: 
"While the referendum proVIsiOn of the 
statute has not heretofore been construed by this 
court, we believe that the reasonable and proper 
construction of the statute supports the position 
of the plaintiff to the effect that the referendum 
provision applies only to a comprehensive type 
of zoning ordinance and dues not apply to an 
altering or amending ordinance." 
17 
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Appellant, in anticipation of the rule of the Minne-
apolis-Honeywell case, has pointed out differences in 
the :Minnesota statute. These differences are conceded, 
but the reasoning and the rules pronounced by the Minne-
sota court in handling this problem on first impression 
are consistent with the ruling in Nebraska, as well as 
with the ruling of the trial court in the instant case. 
Respondent contends that appellant has taken the 
quotation from the case of Walton v Tracy Loan & 
Trust, 97 Utah 249, 92 P2 724, out of the context 
of the court's decision. It is submitted that a reading of 
entire decision makes it clear that when the court 
stated that the exercise of zoning power is a legislative 
function, the court was referring to the original adop-
tion of a comprehensive zoning ordinance ordained by a 
city. Respondent readily concedes that the original 
ordinance adopting a comprehensive zoning plan may 
be subject to referendum, but that is not the question 
now before the court. 
The cases cited by appellant dealing with the 
problems of zoning as applied to the drilling for oil and 
gas in Oklahoma are cases that have been decided under 
peculiar local conditions where Oklahoma cities have 
used zoning power to control the expansion of oil and 
gas drilling within the municipalities. It is submitted 
that the fact situations there involved vary substantially 
from the facts now before the court. 
The Alabama case of Ball v Jones, 132 So2 120, 
is concerned with an Alabama statute and a zoning 
procedure that is radically different from the Utah 
law. A reading of the Alabama case discloses nothing 
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that is in any way analugous to the law question in the 
instant ea~P. 
Appellant nmkP~ no contention that the re-classifi-
cation of the property concerned hy the \Yashington 
TPITH<'P Cit~· Conneil was confiscatory, discriminatory or 
arbitrary. 1\ ppellant has not, at any time, alleged that 
she wns not g-ranh·<l a fair hearing, or that she was 
deprived of any of her rights under the \Vashington 
Terrane<• City Zoning Ordinances or the zoning statutes 
of the state. 
CONCLUSION 
In the nm tter now before the court the city council 
has simply re-classified the property in question from 
residential to com1nercial use. Not a single word of the 
Con1prehensive Zoning Ordinance of the City of Wash-
ington Terrace has been changed; not a single policy 
of said ordinance has been altered. The city council 
has only changed the classification of a single tract 
fr01n residential to conrmercial use in conforn1ance with 
the area proposed as con1mercial in the ~laster Plan. 
If such administrative action on the part of the city 
council and planning connnission can be nullified by 
the electors, then the niaster Plan of the city goes out 
the window, and each change in the use classification of 
any tract of property hereinafter made by the council 
may be subject to a rc~ferendum at the instance of those 
who may not agree. 
To hold that the re-classification of the use o£ a 
single tract of land be subject to a city-wide vote is 
equivalent to finding that the legislature did not use 
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sound judgment in delegating the authority to planning 
commissions and city councils to make zoning studies 
and decisions based upon such studies. Permitting 
each zoning change to be subject to referendum would 
imply that the city council, as the elected representative 
of the people, is incapable of handling zoning changes 
in good faith, with fair deliberation and sound judg-
ment. There would be no sound reasoning for a pro-
cedure which would tie the hands of the city council 
In such an administrative matter. 
Statutes are to be construed to effect their purposes, 
and not so as to bring about absurd results. The lower 
court properly dismissed appellant's Petition for Writ 
of Mandamus, and its Order should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID S. KUNZ, Attorney for 
Respondent, Olive Sorenson, 
City Recorder 
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